Zero-sum stochastic games with the risk-sensitive average criterion

活动时间:2024-12-26 13:30

活动地点:2号学院楼2432

主讲人:郭先平

主讲人中文简介:

郭先平,中山大学数学学院教授、博士生导师,国家杰出青年科学基金获得者。1996年于中南大学获博士学位,2002于中山大学晋升为教授,2003年入选教育部优秀青年教师资助计划,2004年入选教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划,2010年被评为珠江学者特聘教授。担(曾)任国际(SCI)杂志 Advances in Applied Probability,Journal of Applied Probability,Science China Mathematics,Journal of Dynamics and Games及国内期刊《中国科学:数学》、《应用数学学报》、《应用概率统计》、《运筹学学报》等杂志编委。研究兴趣为马氏决策过程、随机博弈、风险控制、排队优化等。

活动内容摘要:

This talk is on the existence and computation of a Nash  equilibrium for the zero-sum stochastic games with the risk-sensitive average criterion. For the games with finite states and actions, we first establish the existence of the value and a Nash equilibrium under a new communication condition, which is slightly weaker than the  irreducibility condition in the existing literature. Then, by introducing a so-called irreducible coefficient and showing its equivalence to the irreducibility condition, we design a value-iteration algorithm, and prove that it can be used to obtain any $\varepsilon$-approximation of the value in a finite number of iterations. Furthermore, basing on the $\varepsilon$-approximation of the value and the irreducible coefficient, we further provide an approximation-algorithm, and also prove that any $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium can be obtained by the approximation-algorithm in a finite number of iterations. Finally,  an numerical example of energy management in smart grids is presented to illustrate our results. 

主持人:闫理坦、张振中